Can an REO Buyer on Long Island Treat the Former Owner as a Tenant at Sufferance?

You closed on a bank-owned (REO) house in Nassau or Suffolk County. The deed is recorded and the keys are yours, but the former owner is still living there. A common move is to serve a 30-day notice under Real Property Law (RPL) § 228, call the occupant a "tenant at sufferance," and file a holdover under RPAPL § 711. Does that work for an REO eviction on Long Island?

The honest answer is maybe, and it carries real risk. The appellate court that hears appeals from the Nassau and Suffolk District Courts has already closed the more obvious door for buyers who purchased from the bank. Meanwhile, trial judges disagree about whether the RPL § 228 route belongs in a summary eviction case at all.

At Witkon Law, we represent Long Island landlords and property owners in eviction cases. Here is what the statutes and courts say as of October 2026.

Why the Usual Post-Foreclosure Route May Be Closed to You

New York already has a statute built for removing occupants after a foreclosure. RPAPL § 713(5) allows a summary proceeding, after a 10-day notice to quit, where the property "has been sold in foreclosure" and the deed delivered pursuant to that sale (or a certified copy) has been exhibited to the occupant. RPAPL § 721(3) says that proceeding may be brought by the purchaser upon the foreclosure sale.

Here is the catch. In a typical REO purchase, the lender took title at the referee’s sale, and you then bought from the lender with your own deed. Your deed was not delivered pursuant to the foreclosure sale.

That is exactly what happened in Sequoia Partners, LLC v Ali, a Suffolk County District Court case. A referee sold the property to U.S. Bank in May 2017. Sequoia bought it from the bank in June 2018 in an arm’s-length sale by special warranty deed, then won possession at trial under § 713(5).

The Appellate Term, 9th and 10th Judicial Districts, reversed and dismissed the case. It held that Sequoia, as a purchaser from a purchaser in foreclosure, lacked standing under § 713(5). It added that the case could not be maintained under any other part of § 713 either. The court relied on Castle Peak 2012-1 REO, LLC v New York Found. for Senior Citizens (App Term, 2d Dept 2019), which limits § 713(5) to the holder of a deed delivered pursuant to a foreclosure sale.

That same appellate court reviews eviction appeals from both the Suffolk and Nassau County District Courts, so Sequoia carries real weight in Long Island eviction cases.

The Workaround: RPL § 228 and the "Tenant at Sufferance"

With § 713(5) off the table, many REO buyers turn to RPL § 228. It says a tenancy at will or by sufferance, "however created," may be ended by a written notice of at least 30 days. The notice is delivered to the tenant or a person of suitable age and discretion living there, or posted on the premises if neither can be found. After 30 days, the owner may re-enter, sue to recover possession, or proceed "in the manner prescribed by law."

So is a former owner a tenant at sufferance? The Long Island Appellate Term has defined the term. In 4720 Ave., Inc. v House (2023), a Nassau County case, it said a tenancy at sufferance arises when an occupant stays after a possessory interest ends and has no privity with the party now entitled to possession. It also confirmed that tenancies at will and at sufferance both require a 30-day notice under RPL § 228. (House itself involved a squatter whose deed was a forgery.)

A 2025 Queens decision applied that definition after a foreclosure. In 11114 101 Ave Corp. v Ramlogan, the former owners lost the property in a 2017 foreclosure judgment, and the petitioner bought it in November 2020. The dispute involved ground-floor space used as a temple. The petitioner served a 30-day RPL § 228 notice and filed a holdover.

The court denied the occupants’ motion to dismiss. It held that a tenancy at sufferance does not require any prior landlord-tenant relationship, and that former owners who remained after foreclosure fit the definition. The court later denied reargument.

That sounds like a green light. It is not, for the reasons below.

Three Problems With Filing Under RPAPL § 711

1. Section 711 is built for landlord-tenant relationships. RPAPL § 711 is titled "Grounds where landlord-tenant relationship exists." Section 713 covers the opposite situation. A former owner never rented from you. Even the Ramlogan court said the relief flowed through RPL § 228, not § 711(1). It excused the § 711 citation as excess verbiage that did not prejudice the occupants. Another judge may not be so forgiving.

2. Some judges say the eviction court has no jurisdiction over these cases at all. In Gomez v Gomez (Civ Ct, Kings County, Jan. 9, 2026), the court dismissed a holdover brought after an RPL § 228 notice. It held that nothing in RPAPL Article 7 gives the court subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings to remove a tenant at sufferance. The court cited Sequoia as an example of how strictly the Appellate Term reads Article 7. It also noted that a 2025 Queens decision, Macias v Macias, reached the opposite result.

Gomez, Ramlogan, and Macias are New York City Civil Court decisions, so they do not bind the Nassau or Suffolk District Courts. But they show a real split. The Gomez court observed that the question had been squarely addressed only within the past year. We have not found an appellate decision resolving it as of October 2026.

3. Moving quickly may undercut the theory. Ramlogan described delay or laches by the owner as a necessary ingredient of a tenancy at sufferance. An REO buyer who acts promptly may struggle to show that one ever arose.

What If the Occupant Is a Tenant of the Former Owner?

If the former owner rented the home to someone, different rules apply.

Under RPAPL § 1305, a "successor in interest" includes anyone who takes title through a foreclosure judgment, or at any time after that but before the tenant’s protection period ends. A "tenant" includes someone on a lease, or someone paying rent to the former owner under an oral or implied rental agreement. The successor must give written notice that the tenant may stay for the rest of the lease term or 90 days from the mailing of the notice, whichever is longer.

Federal law adds another layer. The Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, permanently restored in 2018, requires the immediate successor in interest at foreclosure to give bona fide tenants 90 days’ notice before eviction.

Never use self-help. RPAPL § 711 states that no tenant or lawful occupant of a dwelling may be removed except in a special proceeding. Under RPAPL § 768, changing the locks without giving a key, removing belongings, or cutting essential services to force out someone who has lawfully occupied a unit for 30 days or more is unlawful. An intentional violation is a class A misdemeanor, with civil penalties of $1,000 to $10,000 per violation.

A Practical Game Plan for Nassau and Suffolk REO Buyers

  1. Pull the full chain of title. Get the referee’s deed and your own deed. If you bought from the bank, plan as if § 713(5) is unavailable under Sequoia.
  1. Identify every occupant. A former owner, the former owner’s relatives, a rent-paying tenant, and a stranger who moved in later are each treated differently.
  1. Match the notice to the theory. A 10-day notice to quit, a 30-day RPL § 228 notice, and a 90-day RPAPL § 1305 notice are not interchangeable. The wrong one can sink the case.
  1. Plead accurately. If you rely on RPL § 228, say so plainly, and expect a jurisdiction challenge like the one in Gomez.
  1. Weigh a plenary action. RPL § 228 itself allows an action to recover possession, and Gomez dismissed without prejudice to one under RPAPL Article 6. It is more involved than a summary proceeding but avoids the jurisdiction fight.

Talk to a Long Island Eviction Attorney Before You Serve Anything

The notice you serve on day one shapes everything that follows. Witkon Law represents property owners and landlords in eviction matters across Nassau and Suffolk Counties. If you bought an REO property and the former owner or a tenant will not leave, contact Witkon Law for a case review before you serve a notice or file a petition.

This article is general information, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can I use a 10-day notice under RPAPL § 713(5) if I bought my REO home from the bank?

Probably not on Long Island. In Sequoia Partners, LLC v Ali, the Appellate Term for the 9th and 10th Judicial Districts held that a buyer who purchased from the foreclosure-sale purchaser lacks standing under § 713(5).

Is a former homeowner a tenant at sufferance after foreclosure?

A Queens court said yes in 2025, holding that no prior landlord-tenant relationship is required. A Brooklyn court ruled in 2026 that the eviction court lacks jurisdiction over tenant-at-sufferance cases, so the issue remains unsettled.

Sources

  • RPAPL § 711, § 713, § 721, § 768, § 1305, NY State Senate Open Legislation.
  • Real Property Law § 228, NY State Senate Open Legislation.
  • Federal Reserve CA 18-4, Restoration of the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (2018).